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The following materials contain (1) the warranty provisions, 
§§2-313 through 2- 318, from the October, 1995 Draft of Revised 
Article 2, Sales, with selected Reporter's Notes; (2) Discussion 
questions on warranties; and (3) A comparison of Revised Article 
2 and the ALI's Products Liability Restatement (Tent . Draft #2, 
March 13, 1995}, with discussion problems. 
1. Warranties: Revised Article 2, Sale (Oct. 1995) 
PART 3 
GENERAL OBLIGATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT 
SECTION 2-313. EXPRESS WARRANTIES. 
(a) An express warranty is an affirmation of fact or promise 
which relates to the goods, a description of the goods or an 
affirmation that the whole of the goods shall conform to any 
sample or model made by a seller, including a manufacturer, to a 
buyer, which becomes part of an agreement with the buyer under 
subsection (d). However, an affirmation merely of the value of 
the goods or a s~ate~ent purporting to be merely the seller's 
opinion or comm~ndation of the goods does not create an express 
warranty. 
{b) To create an express warranty it is not necessary that 
the seller use tormal words, such as "warrant" or "guarantee", or 
have a specific intention to make a warranty. 
(c) An express warranty may be made by the seller (i) to an 
immediate buyer, see §2-318(a), (ii) to a remote buyer through an 
authorized dealer or other intermediary and (iii) to a remote 
buyer through any form of public advertising. 
(d) Any description, sample, affirmation, promise or 
statement which relates to the goods made by the seller under 
subsection (a) to a buyer under subsection (c), presumptively 
become part of the agreement with the seller and creates an 
express warranty that the goods will conform to the affirmation, 
promise or statement. However, no obligation is created if the 
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seller establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a 
reasonable person in the position of the buyer would conclude 
that either the seller merely affirmed the value of the goods or 
merely stated an opinion or commenda·tion or that any affirmations 
of fact or promises did not become part of the agreement. 
(e) Subject to Section 2-318, the buyer may enforce an 
express warranty created' under subsection ('d) directly against 
the seller, even though the express warranty is not part of the 
contract with the remote buyer's seller. 
SOURCE: Sales, Section 2-313 (March, 1995) 
Notes 
1. The May, 1994 Draft of Section 2-313 was further revised 
after the March , 1995 meeting of the Drafting Committee to 
clarify and narrow its scope. 
2. Subsection {a) ties ·the definition of vlhat an express 
warranty is [an affirmation of fact or promise or description or 
sample] to whether it becomes part of the agreement with the 
buyer under subsection (d). Thus, an affirmation of fact [e.g., 
this horse has never had a broken bone], has the potential to 
become an express warranty if it becomes part of th'e agreement 
under subsection (d) . The distinction between an express 
warranty and "puffing" is also drawn in subsection (a). But a 
statement of opinion by the seller (e.g ., this horse is the 
fastest ever], can never be an express warranty. The line 
between affirmations of fact and "puffing" as well as whether an 
affirmation of fact becomes part of the agreement, however, is 
drawn through the proof process described in subsection (d). 
3. Subsection (c) states that an express warran·ty may be 
made to an immediate buyer from the seller (the direct 
contractual relationship}, to a remote buyer through an 
authorized dealer or intermediary (two contracts-- the dealer does 
not make the \'Jarranty as a agent of the seller), and to a remo·te 
buyer from a seller other than a dealer through public 
advertising. This extension is consistent with the caselaw. See 
§2-318(a) for relevant definitions. 
4. subsection {d) states when a claimed express warranty 
becomes part of an agreement between the buyer and the seller and 
creates an obligation that the goods will conform to the express 
warranty. 
First, no·te that an agreement creating· an obligation can 
arise between a seller and buyer who do not have a direct · 
contractual relationship~ For example, if th~ seller affirms in 
a trade journal that described goods will do X, the buyer reads 
the affirmation and buys the advertised goods from another 
seller, the affirmation can create an express warran·ty (an 
obligation] between the affirming seller and the buyer. 
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Second, the "basis of the bargain" language is repl aced with 
the phrase "presumptively becomes part of an agreement" wi·th the 
seller. If an express warranty becomes part of an agreement , it 
creates an obligation to 'the buyer that the goods will conform t o 
the warranty . Under this ·test, there i s no requirement. ·that the 
buyer, as an initial matter, prove reli ance on the express 
warranty. The presumption includes representations made before , 
at the time of and after contract formation . The latter, as 
contract modifications, must pass the "good faith agreement" 
test of §2-210(a) . See, e.g . , Downie v. Abex Corp., 741 F.2d 123 5 
(lOth Cir. 1984) . I 
Third, any affirmations, promises or statements abou·t t he 
goods are presumptively part of the agreement. It is not 
necessary for the buyer to establish as an initial matter that 
the affirmations or statements were not "puffing. 11 This fo llows 
former §2-313, comment 8 (1990 Official Text) and the caselaw. 
See, e.g . , Daughtrey v . Ashe, 413 S.E. 2d 336 (Va. 1992); Keith v . 
Buchanan, 220 Cal . Rptr . 392 (Cal. App. 1985) . See also, Sessa 
v. Riegle, 427 F . supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1977) , aff'd without 
opinion, 568 F . 2d 770 (3d cir . 1978). 
Finally, the seller can rebu·t ·the presumption of inclusion 
by establishing through a preponderance of the evidence ·that the 
affirmation or statement was "puffing" or that an affirmation of 
fact or promise did not become part of the agreement. . In both 
cases, the question is whether a reasonable person in the 
position of the buyer would conclude e ither ·that what was said 
was "puffing" or that an aff i rmation of fact did not become part 
of the agreement. For example, the seller migh·t establish that an 
affirm~tion of fact [this horse has never had a broken bone) did 
not become part of the agreement because e ither the buyer was 
unaware of it, or did not believe it or relied upon the skill and 
judgment of a third person rather that the seller's affirmation. 
In these cases, the form of alleged express warranties {were they 
oral or in a record and if in a record, was it a record to which 
both parties assented), .t he content of the representation and the 
relative information and opportunities of both parties mus·t also 
be taken into account . 
This approach was approved in principle at the March, 1995 
meeting of the Drafting Committee . 
5. Revised §2- 313(c) permits the creation of an obligation 
by a seller to a buyer with whom there i s no d~rect contractual 
relationship . ·· The extent to which that obliga·tion can be 
346 
enforced is determined in §2-318. The buyer may also have a 
claim against its immediate seller for the breach of warranty 
relating to the same nonconformity. Presumably, the buyer will 
sue its immediate buyer and join the remote seller in the same 
litigation. 
SECTION 2-314. IMPLI~D WARRANTY: MERCHANTABILITY; USAGE OF 
TRADE. 
(a) Subject to Section 2-316, a warranty that goods are 
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the 
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. The 
serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the 
premises or elsewhere is a sal~ under this section . 
(b) To be merchantable, goods, at a minimum, must : 
(1) pass without objection in the trade under the 
contract description; 
(2) in the case of fungible goods, be of fair average 
quality within the description; 
(3) be fit for the ordinary purposes for which such 
goods are used; 
(4) run, within the variations permitted by the 
agreement , of even kind, quality, and quantity within each unit 
and among all units involved; 
·. 
(5) be adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as 
the agreement or circumstances may require; 
(6) conform to the promise or affirmations of fact if 
any made on the container or label ; and 
(7) in the case of goods sold for human consumption or 
for application to the human body, be reasonably fit for 
consumption or application. 
(c) Subject to Section (former 2-316), other implied 
warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade. 
SOURCE: Sales, Section 2-314 (March, 1995) 
Notes 
1. Subsection (b) (7) is new. Recent cases have rejected the 
traditional foreign/natural object distinction jn disputes ov~r 
the _quality of food, see, e.g., Mix v . Ingersol Candy Co., 59 
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P.2d 144 (Cal. 1936}, in favor of some variation of a reasonable 
expectations test . Under the traditional test, if the buyer was 
injured by a natural ingredient (i.e . , a bone in fish chowder} 
the goods were found to be merchantable even though ·the buyer was 
unaware of the bone . Under the evolving test, the fish chowder 
might be unmerchantable if a reasonable buyer would not expect 
it, see Jackson v. Nestle-Beich, Inc . , 589 N. E.2d 547 (Ill. 
1992) (turkey bone in processed turkey) or if the bone would not 
be expected by a reasonable consumer of the buyer's age and 
experience. See Phillips v. Town of West Springfield, 540 N.E.2d 
1331 (Mass. 1992} (objective-subjective) . See also, Mexicali Rose 
v. Superior Court, 822 P.2d 1292 (Cal . 1992) (if ingredient is 
natural to preparation of food it is reasonably expected and 
cannot be unfit.) 
New subsection (b) (7} was deleted by the Drafting Committee 
at the October, 1995 meeting. 
2. Revised §2-314 is not intended to displace or preempt 
the so-called "blood shield" statutes enacted by many states, 
which immunize suppliers of blood and other body parts from 
implied warranty liability under Article 2 or strict liability in 
tort . See, e.g., Doe v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 698 F . 
Supp. 780 (D . Minn. 1988}. 
SECTION 2-315. IMPLIED WARRANTY: FITNESS FOR PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE. Subject to Section 2-316, if a seller at the time of 
contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which 
the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the 
seller's skill or judgment to select ~r furnish suitable goods, 
there is an implied warranty that the goods are fit for that 
purpose. 
SOURCE: Sales, Section 2-315 (March, 1995) 
SECTION 2-316. EXCLUSION OR MODIFICATION OF WARRANTIES. 
(a} Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express 
warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty 
must be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each 
other. Subject to Section 2-202 with regard to parol or extrinsic 
evidence, words negating or limiting a contract are inoperative 
to the extent that such a construction is unreasonable . 
(b) Except in a consumer contract, to exclude or modify an 
implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the 
language must in a record, mention merchantability, and be 
conspicuous. 
(c) Except in a consumer contract, to exclUde or modify any 
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implied warranty of fitness, the language of exclusion must be in 
a record and be conspicuous. Language excluding all implied 
warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states "'J.'here are no 
warranties extend beyond the description on the face hereof," or 
words of similar effect. 
(d) Except in a consumer contract , but notwithstanding 
subsections (b) and (c),~the following rules apply: 
(1) All implied warran·ties are excluded by expressions 
like "as is", "with all faults", or other language that in common 
understanding or under the circumstances calls the buyer's 
attention to the exclusion of warranties and clearly indicates 
that there is no implied warranty. 
(2) If the buyer before entering into the contract has 
examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as desired or 
has refused to examine the goods, there is no implied warranty 
with regard to nonconformities that an examination should in the 
circumstances have revealed. 
(3) An implied warranty may be excluded or modified by 
course of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade. 
(e} In a consumer contract, terms excluding or modifying the 
implied warranty of merchantability or the implied warranty of 
fitness for particular purpose must be in a record. The terms are 
inoperative unless the seller proves by clear and affirmative 
evidence that the buyer expressly agreed to them. 
(f) Remedies for breach of warranty may be limited in 
accordance with this Article on liquidation or limitation of 
damages and on contractual modification of remedy. 
SOURCE: Sales, section 2-316 (March, 1995) 
Notes 
1. subsection (a) preserves the policy that when an express 
warranty and a disclaimer of that warranty are inconsistent, the 
disclaimer is inoperative, subject to §2~202 (the "parol evidence 
rule". The enforceability of merger clauses in standard form 
contracts is governed by §2-206. 
2. In commercial contracts, disclaimers of anY. implied 
warranty must be in a record, be conspicuous and cornply with 
requirements on the content of the disclaimer. ComplJance with 
these requirements provides a limited safe harbor, since other 
aspects of the doctrine of unconscionability may apply. See 
§2-105 (a). Als·o, the disclaimer is ineffective where the 
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requirements of subs ection (b) or (c ) are not met even though t he 
buyer knows of the discl aime r c l ause. Since this appears to 
elevate form over subs t ance , t he Drafting Committee has directed 
that t he matter be recons ide r ed . 
3. Subsection {e ) states the exclusive requirements in a 
consumer contract for the s e ller to disclaim or limit any i mplied 
warranty . This applies to ' new, used, or distress goods or 
seconds, and preempts Subsect ion {d). Rather ·than providing that 
such disclaimers are inoperat i ve, subsection (e) puts the burden 
on the seller to show by c l ear and affirma·tive evidence that the 
cons umer expressly agreed to the term in the record. This .is a 
more exacting requirement t han those imposed by §2- 106, on 
Standard Form Records. 
4 . Subsections (b) and (c ) are subject to subsection (d). 
Thus , in commercial cont ract s , where used or distress goods are 
f r equently i nvolved, disclaimers of implied warranties are 
effective when the requirements of subsection (d) (1} are met . To 
the extent that subsection (d) appl ies, substance prevails over 
the form of disclaimer . 
SECTION 2-317 . CUMULATION AND CONFLICT OF WARI~IES. 
Warranties, whether expres s or imp l ied, must be construed as 
consistent with each other and as cumulative . However, if that 
construction would be unreas onabl e , t he intent of the parties 
determines which warranty pr evai l s . In ascertaining tha·t i ntent, 
the following rules apply : · 
(1) Exact or technical specifications prevail over an 
inconsistent sample or mode l or general language of description. 
(2) A sample from an exi sting bulk prevail over inconsistent 
general language of description . 
(3) Except in a consumer contract under Section 2-1305(e) , 
an express warranty prevails over i nconsistent implied w·arran·ties 
other than an implied warrant y of fitness for a particular 
purpose. 
SOURCE : Sales, section 2 - 317 (March , 1995) 
Notes 
1 . One change was made i n §2-317 . An i mplied warranty of 
merchantability in a cons umer contract that i s inconsistent wit h 
an express warranty is not d isplaced under §2-317(3). Rather, t he 
requirements of §2-316(b) mus t be satisfied. 
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SECTION 2-318 . EXTENSION OF EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES . 
(a) In this section, "seller" includes a manufacturer, 
"immediate buyer" means a buyer in privity of contract with a 
sel ler, "remote buyer" means a buyer other than from the seller, 
"goods" includes a component incorporated i n s ubstantially t he 
same condition into other goods, and "beneficiary" means a person 
to whom a warranty extends under subsection (b) . 
(b) The seller's express or implied warranty, made to an 
immediate buyer, extends to any person who may reasonably be 
expected to buy, use or be affected by the goods and who is 
damaged by breach of the warranty . The rights and remedies of a 
beneficiary against a seller for breach of a warranty extended 
under this subsection are deter mined by the enforceable terms of 
the contract between the seller and the immediate buyer and this 
Act . 
(c) If a merchant seller sells new goods to an immediate 
buyer which are unmerchantable at the time of delivery and the 
remote buyer is a reasonably expected consumer buyer who is 
damaged by breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, 
§2-314, or the seller makes an express warranty to a remote buyer 
under §2-313{c) and (d), the following rules apply: 
(1) The remote buyer may sue the seller without regard 
to t he terms of the contract between the seller and the immediate 
buyer; and 
(2) The remote buyer's rights and remedies against the 
seller are determined under this Act, as modif ied by subsection 
(d) • 
(d) A remote buyer under subsection (c) has the rights and 
remedies available against the seller provided by this Act, 
except as follows; 
(1) The time for g1v1ng any requ ired notice begins to 
run no earlier than when the remote buyer receives the goods; 
(2) A remote buyer other than a consumer buyer cannot 
recover consequential damages unless the conditions of subsection 
(3) are satisfied; 
(3) Upon receipt of a timely notice of rejection or 
revocation of acceptance, the seller may within a reasonable time 
offer to refund the price paid by the remote buyer or offer to 
supply goods that conform to the warranty . If such an offer · is 
made and satisfied, the seller's liability is l~mited to 
incidental damages under §2-705. If t he seller fails to comply 
with this subsection, the remote buyer may claim damages for 
breach of warranty, including incidental and consequential 
damages under §§2-705 and 2-706. 
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(4} A cause of action for breach of warranty accrues no 
earlier than when the ~emote buyer receives the goods . 
(e) A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this 
section. 
SOURCE: Sales, section 2-318 (March, 1995). 
Notes 
1. Section 2-318 has been the subject of considerable 
discussion, both within and without the Drafting Committee , and 
is still a "work in progress . " After the 1994 NCCUSL Annual 
Meeting, the May, 1994 Draft was further revised for clarity and 
was discussed at the March, 1995 meeting of the Drafting 
Committee. In response to suggestions made at that meeting, the 
section was further revised for clarity and consistency and 
subsection (c) was lirniteq to sellers of unmerchantable new 
goods. 
2. overview. Section 2-318 deals with warranty claims by a 
buyer (called a "remote" buyer to distinguish a buyer with 
privity, called an "immediate" buyer] against a seller .with whom 
there is no privity of contract. see subsection (a) . The remote 
buyer may be a commercial or a consumer buyer and may have claims 
for economic loss and fqr damage to P~.rson or property. 
The remote buyer may sue the seller in two types of cases. 
In the first, ~ seller's warranty made to an immediate buyer is 
extended to a foreseeable buyer or user (a "beneficiary") who is 
damaged by the breach. Subsection (b). In these cases, the 
beneficiary's rights against the seller are limited by the terms 
of the contract between the seller and the immediate buyer and 
the terms of this Act. It is, in short, a derivative warranty 
and the beneficiary stands in the shoes of the immediate buyer. 
In the second, the seller is potentiall y liable to a remote, 
foreseeable consumer buyer for unmerchantable new goods sold to 
an immediate buyer and for express warranties made to remote 
buyers through a dealer or directly through advertising and the 
like under §2-313(c). Subsection (c) . This is not a derivative 
warranty. Rather, the remote buyer has a direct action against 
the seller, the scope of which is under Article 2 as modified by 
subsection (d) . 
3. Under subsection (b), all warranties• made by a seller, 
' 
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including a manufacturer, for goods, including components, sold 
to an immediate buyer are extended to reasonably expected buyers 
or persons who use, consume or are affected by the goods and are 
damaged by breach of warrant:y. '!'his extension is broader that 
Alternative c in §2-318 the 1990 Official Text in that it 
includes damages (not just injury) to buyers (vertical privity) 
and "any" person, not just "natural" persons. Fuethermore, it 
applies across the board. ~here are no alternatives. 
Although protected buyers and users are called beneficiaries 
under subsection (b) , the extension :Ls based upon policy rather 
than intention of the parties. A seller should be responsible to 
foreseeable buyers and users for at least the quality of the 
goods warranted to the immediate buyer. But, since the warranty 
is derivative, the beneficiary is bound by the terms and 
conditions of the contract between the seller and immediate 
buyer. Thus, disclaimers and agreed limited remedies in that 
contract bind the beneficiaries as well. See subsection (a), 
last sentence. Put differently, policy may dictate an extension 
under subsection (a), but it does not require seller liability 
beyond that for which it bargained with the immediate buyer. 
This extension is in the borderland between warranty, a 
contract theory, and tort. The extension in subsection (b) is 
justified on grounds similar to those for imposing strict. tort 
l iability. But the limitations on the extension are determined 
by contract, the bargain between the seller and the immediate 
buyer. Thus, even if the breach causes damage to the person or 
property of a foreseeable buyer or user, subsection (a) controls 
the outer limits of liability. 
4. The derivative theory of subsection (b) does not apply 
to the cases described in subsection (c). Thus, remote, consumer 
buyers and remote buyers to whom an express warranty has been 
made under §2-313 may sue the seller free of the lack of privity 
defense and the terms in the contract between the seller and the 
immediate buyer. This codifies the result reached in most cases. 
There is no intention to preclude the courts from applying 
the principle of subsection (c) to unmerchantable goods which are 
sold by M to R and resold to a commercial buyer. See §2A-316. 
See also, Hininger v. Case Corp., 23 F.3d ~24 (5th Cir. 1994), 
where the court, applying Texas law, held that the privity 
defense was available to the manufacturer of a component which 
was resold as part of d combine to a commercial buyer but not to 
'che manufacturer of the combine which is resold to a co1nmercial 
buyer. 
5. Remote buyers protected under subsection (c) who sue the 
seller for a breach of a warranty are not subject to the "no 
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privity" defense or the limitations of subsection (b). They may 
sue the seller as if there were privity of contract under Article 
2, subject to subsection (d) . Subsection (d) provides ad justments 
that reflect the reality that the remote buyer has not contracted 
with the seller . 
A key issue in subsection (d) is the treatment of 
consequential damages . ' Should the sel ler be liable to a remote 
buyer with whom it has not contracted for conseq11ential damages 
proved under §2-706? For remote consumer buyers the answer is 
yes. For remote commercial buyers, the answer i s no unless the 
seller has failed to offer either a refund or to supply 
conforming goods within a reasonable time. If th~ offer is made 
and the buyer does not accept it, consequential damages are 
foreclosed. The seller, of course, may still exclude liability 
for consequential damages to a remote buyer by an agreement with 
that buyer, i.e., through a dealer . 
2. warranty Questions Under Revised Article 2. 
Problem 1 
I. Manufacturer makes and sells earth moving equipment . In 
the typical distribution, manufacturer sells equipment to a 
wholesaler who either sells directly to large purchasers or sells 
through retailers to smaller purchasers . In its contract wi t h 
its distributor, the manufacturer disclaims all implied 
warranties. The contract also has an integration clause that 
provides that there are no express warranties macin beyond t he 
four corners of the agreement . The express warranties in ·the 
agreement are no more than a description of the goods and a 
statement that the goods are "free of defects in material and 
workmanship." The contract provides that the express warranties 
apply only to defects which are discovered and reported within 
one year of the sale . 
Manufacturer also advertises its equipment ~n trade 
journals. Those advertisements make favorable comparisons of 
this earth moving equipment to comparable caterpillar equipment. 
The advertisements contain specific statements about: reliability 
(i,e., no more than 2% down time) and load carrying capacity 
(e.g., bucket can lift three cubic yards per scoop and 4, 000 
pounds). 
Assume a mining company buys ten of these earth devices for 
$1 million each from a wholesaler. During the first year it has 
trouble making them work. The equipment proves to he 
unprofitable to run because it cannot lift as much as the 
advertisement suggested, because the equipment does not have a 
large enough footprint and accordingly is re~eatedly bogged down 
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in the wet conditions in which it is made to work, and because 
the engines require excessive periodic repair and have been out 
of service for substantial periods of time. Ultimately buyer 
gives up on the equipment 18 months after its purchase and sues 
the manufacturer. 
Buyer's theory against Manufacturer includes the following: , 
1. Manufacturer broke the implied warranty of 
merchantability under 2-314. 
2. Manufacturer broke the implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose under 2-315. 
3. Manufacturer made an express warranty of perfornamce by 
the advertisement. 
4. Manufacturer is liable on its express warranty 
concerning material and workmanship. 
Manufacturer responds as follows: 
1. The advertisement cannot be an express warranty because 
it is merely puffing under 2-313(a). 
2. The advertisement cannot be an express warranty to the 
remote buyer because it never became "part of an agreement with 
the buyer under subsection (b)," 2-313(a) and to that extent is 
invalid. 
3 . Buyer did not see the advertisement until his lawyer in 
this lawsuit found it and showed it to him . Even assuming it is 
not puffing , there is no warranty liability based upon the 
statement in the advertisement. (Compare 2-313(e) with 2-313(a) 
and (b) and Comments 4 and 5 to 2-313.) 
4. There is no liability under the implied warranty of 
merchantability because the warranty was effectively disclaimed. 
5. Even t hough the merchant that made the sale directly to 
the m1n1ng company may have known of Buyer's purpose, 
Manufacturer never did and therefore 2-315 cannot be asserted 
against it. 
6. Whether or not the implied warranty was effectively 
disclaimed, technical specifications prevail over general 
language or description under 2-317. That rule applies not only 
to the cont ract but also to the advertisement. 
7. In any event the mining company canno~ recover 
consequential damages because of 2-318(d) (2). Having failed to 
give timely notice of rejection or revocation of acceptance, it 
is entirely cut off from consequential damages. 
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8. Buyer cannot qualify under 2-318(a) (3) since the goods 
are fit for ordinary purposes and any damages are lost profits or 
uniquely associated with the buyer's business. All are of 
Buyer's consequential damages under 2-706 and none can be 
recovered. 
Problem 2 
Joe camel, a 23 year old resident of San Francisco, became 
uniquely attached to Red Dog, Miller's new dark beer . over a 
three year period, he drank progressively more beer until 
ultimately he was consuming a case and a half a day. As a result 
of that consumption, he fell deathly ill of cirrhosis, and sued 
Miller both for breach of express warranty under 2-313 and breach 
of implied warranty of merchantability under 2-314. He 
specifically cited 2-314(b) (7). 
Miller moved for summary judgment on the following grounds: 
1. The advertisements which showed a powerful red dog were 
at most "an affirmation merely of the value of the goods" and 
could certainly not be construed to be a specific warranty that 
excessive use of alcohol would not cause cirrhosis. 
2. Red Dog is "reasonably fit for consumption." 
Moreover, Miller warns its customers. The last paragraph of 
Comment 2 to 3-314 notes "a preferred test, however is whether a 
reasonable person in the position of the buyer should have been 
aware of and been able to take precautions against the risk. If 
an adequate warning is not given, goods whose natural ingredients 
cause damage may be unmerchantable." Miller notes that both its 
ads and its labels warn against excessive consumption and states 
that any drinker should have been aware of and been able to take 
reasonable precautions against the risk. 
How do respond on behalf of Joe to those arguments? 
3. The Products Liability Restatement and Revised Article 
2, Sales 
History 
The content of Article 2, Sales, has not changed since the 
1958 Official Text. Section 2-715(2) (b) in the 1990 Official 
Tex~, which was in the 1952 Official Draft of ~he UCC, provides 
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that "consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach 
include ••. (b) injury to person or property proximately resulting 
from any breach of warranty." This provision codified the "usual 
rule" as to breach of v1arranty, which imposed liabilit.y upon 
sellers where unmerchantable goods, frequently food, caused 
personal injuries to consumer buyers. See §2-715 , comment 5. 
See also , William Prosser, •rhe Implied Warranty of Merchantable 
Quality, 27 Minn. L. Rev~ 117 (1943). 
Section 402A of the Restatement, Second of Torts was 
promulgated in 1964, thereby stimulating the strict products 
liability revolution. Although there were overlaps be'tween 
Article 2 and §402FI. where personal injuries and property damage 
were involved, neither was intended to preempt 'the other. Thus, 
a plaintiff injured by an allegedly unsafe product could sue in 
either warranty or tort. The route was smoother in tort, 
however, since sales intricacies such as disclaimers, privity, 
notice, and the sales statute of limitations were not available 
as a defense. 
More recently, acceptance by many courts of the so-called 
"economic loss" doc·trine has lill\ited the scope of tort liability 
where defective products are involved. The emphasis is upon the 
type of loss caused by the alleged defect. If the loss is 
commercial rather than to person or property, tort law is not 
available and the plaintiff must recover for breach of warranty, 
if at all. See East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica 
Delaval, Inc. , 476 U. S. 858 (1986) and its progeny. In short, 
beyond the borders of tort, product risk allocation is left to 
the domain of contract, including Article 2 of the UCC. See M. 
Geistfeld, The Political Economy of Neo-contractual Proposals for 
Product Liability Reform, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 803 (1994); William 
Jones, Product Defects Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascendancy of 
Contract Over Tort , 44 U. Miami L. Rev. 731 (1990). 
Article 2 is currently under revision and the American Law 
Institute is considering a new Restatement of Products Liability. 
(RPL) See American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Third, 
Torts: Products Liability (Tent . Draft #2, March 13, 1995) . See 
symposium, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1043 (1994). See also, Carl T. Bogus, 
War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the center of Produc·ts 
Liability, 60 Mo. L. Rev. 2 (1995); Marshalls. Shapo, In Search 
of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI Restatement Project , 48 
vand . L. Rev. 1 (1995). The purpose of this outline is to 
compare the current status of these important documents . 
Comparisons 
For better or worse, the "tail that wags the dog" i n this 
comparison is the type of injury resulting from ·the allegedly 
defective product. So we will start with the tail and work up. 
A. Type of Injury. 
Article 2. 
Section 2-715(2) (b) of the 1990 Official Text defines 
consequential damages "resulting from the seller's 
breach" to include "injury to person or property 
proximately resulting from any breach of warranty." 
To date, no change has been .made in this provision. 
See §2-706 (a) (2) (Oct. 1995). 
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Should Article 2 be limited to claims for commercial or 
economic loss? Compare the Article 5 of the Convention 
on the International Sale of Goods which states that 
CISG "does not apply to the liability of the seller for 
death or personal injury caused by the goods to any 
person." If so limited, what would fill the gap 
between warranty and tort liability? See Jay Feinman, 
Economic Negligence (1995) . 
Section 1 states when a defendant is liable "for harm" 
caused by a defective product. "Harm" means "harm to 
persons or property ." §1(a) . See Comment d. 
Section 6 states that "harm to persons and property" 
· includes "economic loss only when caused by harm to: 
(a) the plaintiff's person; (b) the person of another 
when harm to the other interferes with a legally 
protected interest of the plaintiff; (c) the 
plaintiff's property other than the defective product 
itself." 
In cases of harm to property other than the defective 
product, the extent to which the parties can contract 
for liability or remedy more limited than normally 
provided by tort is left to developing case law. §6, 
Comment f. 
Section 10 deals with the required causal connection 
between product defect and harm. 
Section 11 deals with increased harm due to a product 
defect. 
B. Potential ·nefendants 
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Ar ticle 2 . 
;RPL •. 
The defendant under Ar t icl e 2 is a seller, defined as a 
"person who sells or contr acts to sell goods." 
§2-103 ( 1) (d) . 
The word "seller" is used cons i stently and excl usively 
in the key sec~ions on liability for breach of 
warranty . See §§2-313, 2- 314, 2-3 15, 2-714 a nd 2-715. 
only a seller who is a "merchant wit h respect to goods 
of that kind" makes an implied warranty of 
merchantability . §2-314(1), s e e §2-314(a ) {Oct. 1995) . 
"Merchant" is defined in §2- 104(1) , see §2-102(a} (3 ) 
(Oct . 19 9 5 ) • 
No changes are made in Revised Art i c l e 2 . 
Section 1(a) limits liability to a "commercial seller 
or distributor" of defective products. one must be 
"engaged in the business of selli ng or otherwi se 
distributing products" and sell or distri bute a 
defective product. 
RPL applies to sales transactions and "ot her .for ms of 
product distribution that are the funct iona l equivalent 
of product sales." §1, Comment b . This i dea i s 
elaborated in §5. 
The "commercial seller or distr ibutor " limitation i s 
RPL' .s version of Article 2 's "merchant" s e lle r . §1., 
Comment c . 
c . scope and subject Matter . 
Article 2. 
Article 2 applies to "transactions i n goods." §2-102. 
See §2-103(a) (Oct . 1995) , which amplifie s t his phrase. 
Although the prototype transaction is a contract for 
the sale of goods, Article 2 applies to mixed 
transactions where the s ale of goods predominates and 
has been extended by analogy to d isput es over the 
quality of goods sold in t r a nsact ions where services 
pr edominate. 
"Goods" are defined as "all things ( incl uding specially 
manufactured goods) whi ch are mova ble at the time of 
identification to the contract for sale." §2-105(1), 
see §2-102 (a) (25) (Oct. 1995). 
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RPL states the liability of a commercial seller or 
distributor for an alleged defective "product . " §1(a) . , 
Section 4 provides a broad definition of "product," but 
specifically excludes services, §4(c), and human blood 
and human tissue, §4(d) . 
Section 4(a) states: "A 'product' is something 
distributed commercially for use or consumption. Most 
but not necessarily all products are tangible personal 
property; most have been subjected to processing and 
fabricating prior to entering the stream of commerce; 
and most pass through a commercial chain of 
distribution before ultimate use and consumption." 
D. standards of Liability. 
Article 2. 
A seller must make and breach a warranty; express or 
implied. See §§2-313 , 2-314 and 2-315. Warranties are 
treated as terms of the contract for sale. A breach 
occurs when the goods fail at the time of tender to 
conform to the warranty. 
The standard of liability depends upon the type of 
warranty involved. For example, to breach an express 
warranty under §2-313, the goods must fail to conform 
to an affirmation or promise made to the buyer about 
the goods that is part of the agreement. Under §2- 315, 
the goods must fail to conform to the seller's implied 
warranty that the goods are fit for the buyer's 
particular purpose. 
Section 2-314(1) implies a "warranty that the goods 
shall be merchantable •.. in a contract for their sale if 
the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that 
kind." The "serving for value of food or drink to be 
consumed either on the premises or elsewhere" is 
treated as a sale. This "bottom line" implied warranty 
is derived from both representations made by the seller 
about the goods (such as the description, price and 
ordinary uses) and a policy judgment about what 
responsibility a merchant seller should have. 
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RPIJ. 
Under §2-314(2), "goods to be merchantable must be at 
least such" as, among other things, "(a} pass without 
objection in the trade under the contract description; 
and .•. (c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which 
such goods are used; and .•. (e) a.re adequately 
contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may 
. " requ1re .... 
A commercial seller or distributor must sell or 
distribute a "defective product." §l(a). Section 
(1) (b) states that a "product is defective if, at the 
·time of sale or dis·tribution, it contains a 
manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is 
defective because of inadequate instructions or 
warnings." 
A "manufacturing defect" occurs when the "produc·t 
departs from its intended design even though all 
possible care was exercised in the preparation and 
marketing of the product." §2(a)* 
A ndesign defect" occurs vlhen the "foreseeable risks of 
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or 
avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative 
design by the seller or other distributor, or a 
predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, 
and the omission of the alternative design renders the 
product not reasonably safe." §2(b). 
When an otherwise sound product is defective because of 
"inadequate instructions or warnings" is stated in 
§2 (c) • 
section 3 deals with circumstantial evidence supporting 
the inference of a product defect. 
Special rules are provided in Section 8 for harm caused 
by prescription drugs and medical devices and in 
Section 9 for harm caused by defective used products. 
E. Defenses 
Here is a brief comparison the defenses under Article 2 and 
RPL when a plaintiff seeks to recover for damage to person or 
property allegedly caused by a breach of warranty or defective 
product. 
Lack of privity. 
Under Article 2, lack of privity is probably not a 
def-ense in most states where personal injury and 
property damage claims are involved. The answer 
depends upon which Alternative to §2-318 has been 
adopted and the relevant caselaw. With the 
availability of strict products liability, the 
plaintiff has little incentive to sue under Article 2. 
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The October, 1995 Draft of §2- 318 propose s a further 
reduction of the privity defense for breach of warranty 
claims. Under this revision, individuals claiming 
damage to person or property caused by a breach of 
warranty would have a clearer shot at the remote seller 
who made the warranty. Individuals include buyers and 
foreseeable persons who use or are affected by the 
goods . §2-318 (b) (Oct . 1995) . 
Under RPL, lack of privity is not a defense. 
Failure to give timely notice . 
Under Article 2, a buyer who fails to notify the seller 
of a breach "within a reasonable time after he 
discovers or should have discovered any breach" is 
"barred from any remedy . " §2-607(3) (a) . This notice 
condition applies regardless of the nature of the loss. 
Under the october, 1995 revision of Article 2, the 
failure to give notice must prejudice the seller before 
the remedy is barred. See §2-608(c) (1) (Oct. 1995). 
The notice requirement applies even though the buyer is 
suing a remote seller. §2-318(d) (1) (when time to give 
notice begins to run) . 
Under RPL there is no notice requirement . 
Disclaimers of warranty and agreed limitations on remedy. 
Under Article 2, implied warranties may be excluded or 
limited under controlled conditions regardless of the 
type of loss . §2-316 ( 2) , see 2-316 (b) (Oct. 1995) • In 
general, agreements excluding or limiting 
consequential damages are enforceable unless 
unconscionable . §2-719 (3) , see §2-7 09 (c) (Oct . 1995). 
However, a limitation on consequential damages for 
personal injury is "prima facie unconscionable . " 
§2-718(3), see §2-709 (d) (2 ) (Oct.-1995) ·("presumed" to 
be unconscionable). 
Unde·r RPL, disclaimers, limitations , 'Waivers a nd other 
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contract-based defenses to products liability claims 
for harm to persons "do not bar or reduce otherwise 
valid products liability claims." §13. Whether such 
contract based defenses are valid where the only harm 
is to other property is left to developinq caselaw. 
§6, Comment f. 
Other affirmative d~fenses . 
Article 2 does not explicitly deal with such 
affirmative defenses as failure to follow directions 
for use, misuse or contributory fault. Courts must 
draw relevant principles from other sources, See, 
e.g., Chatfield v. Sherwin-Williams co . , 266 N.W.2d 171 
(Minn . 1978), or fit them under t he "proximate cause" 
requirement in §2-715(2) (b). 
Under RPL, defenses such as misuse, alteration or 
modification of a product are treated under the causal 
connection requirement in §10. Defenses relating to 
the apportionment of liability among the plaintiff, 
sellers and distributors and other tortfeasors are 
treated in §12. 
Statute of Limitations. 
Under Article 2, a cause of action for breach of 
warranty accrues when "tender of delivery is made" 
unless the warranty "explicitly extends to future 
performance of the qoods . " _In that latter case, the 
cause of action accrues "when the breach is or should 
have been discovered." §2-725(2). An action for breach 
must be commenced "within four years after the cause of 
action has accrued" unless the parties have agreed to 
reduce it to "not less than one year." §2-725(1). 
Statute of limitations issues are still under 
discussion by the Article 2 Draftinq Committee. 
Under RPL, the appropriate statute of limitations is 
left to state law. Typically, a "discovery" rather than 
a "tolling" statute governs tort claims. 
Policy Questions and Problems 
1. Warranty liability is a theory of s t rict but limited 
liability. Warranties, when made , provide information in the 
form of representations, express or implied, to the buyer about 
the goods. They can be analogized to a form of insurance .in a 
setting where there is imperfect information . 
Except for c ertain food products, RPL has reject~d a 
representational or consumer e xpectation tes't for determining 
design defects. Rather, the defective design que3tion turns on 
"whether the proposed alternative design could be implmnented at 
reasonable cost, or whether an alternative design would provide 
greater overall safety . " §2, Comment (f) at 29. See also, 
Comment (g), dealing with f ood products. 
Consider this question . Suppose that a product it-:> not 
defective under RPL, i.e . , neit her a manufactur.i.n•J o:l:' design 
defect nor a failure to war n , but the product iG un t\Cl~c;han,table 
under ucc §2-314 because, price, description and o.rdlniry use 
considered, it is not fit for ordinary purposes. Suppose, also, 
that the product has "proximately caused" damage to purson and 
property of a buyer . Can the buyer invoke \varranty tlwory under 
Article 2? 
Under Article 2, the answer is clearly yes , p )'lic.lBd that 
the plaintiff jumps through the Article 2 hoops of privity, 
notice, disclaimers, limited r emedies and the nta'cutt! of 
limitations. Under RPL, however, the suggested <nH5\ver 'i.s no. 
See §2, Comment (m) and the Reporter's Notes at 122-·1/U, which 
state: 
Comment M takes the positi on that as long an the plaintiff 
establishes defect under§ 2 (a), § 2(b), or ~2 (c), courts 
are free to utilize the concepts of negligeru~e, ntrict 
liability, or implied warranty of merchantah t•ity as 
theories of liability . Conversely, failure :o lt\<:ci: the 
requisites of§ 2(a), or § 2 (b ) , or§ 2(c) will dc~feat a 
cause of action under either negligence , st:r~.ic:t linb:i.li ty, 
or implied warranty of merchantability 
Is this position sound? Should a court applying Ari:icle 2 be 
bound by limitations in the Product Liability Resi:atement? 
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(2) M, a manufacturer, s e l ls a component to n, a 
manufacturer, to be included in a product which w·:. be :r~esold to 
dealers, D, and then resold t o business and constUil<>J bny(~rs. (BB 
and CB) . The component was unmerchantable because ... "\. contained a 
manufacturing defect at the time i t was delivered to BB, a sole 
proprietorship. As the result of a malfunction, n ~mffcrcd 
personal injuries and the product sold suffered dw·~ge. No other 
property was damaged . B' s business, however, suf. <'rPd 
consequential economic losses during the time ~laat tl1c product 
was out of operation. Assess B' s options uz:tder Art~ic:ln :; andfor 
the Restatement . 
(3} F raises beef cat tle which are sold t.o 11 fc}r r:lcmghter. 
B resells sides of beef to w, a ~vholesaler, wh~> fm·thf r processes 
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t he product and sells it to restaurants in the form of ground 
beef . (R) R cooks sells the beef as hamburgers in its restaurant 
chain to customers . (C) The hamburgers contain e-coli bacteria · 
and many customers become ill, some seriously. Evidence will 
establish that there were e-coli bacteria in the intestines of 
the cattle that F sold to B. What recourse is available to c? 
' 
